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Abstract
Economists and ecologists, in general, have offered differing opinions about the seriousness of
climate change and the need for rapid reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Economists have
tended to urge caution, focusing on the potential for large-scale cutbacks to upset the economy.
Ecologists have tended to focus on the potential for catastrophic losses from climate change,
and have urged extensive shifts in policy. This paper uses the tools of cost benefit analysis and
the decision sciences to examine why members of the two disciplines often reach different
conclusions. First, economists and ecologists start from different perspectives about what is the
point of reference against which policies should be judged. Second, economists and ecologists
tend to apply different discount rates to future impacts of climate change. Third, economists
and ecologists are likely to interpret differently the substantive findings and expressed
uncertainties of formal cost-benefit analysis. Using a simplified version of the DICE model of
climate change, this paper explores how these different viewpoints can be expressed in practice.
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Introduction
In research on the environment, and climate change as an issue in particular, many traditional
economists seem to be staid and complacent. Market transactions, they reason, allow people to
pursue the objectives that they value most. People substitute different public and private goods,
among them environmental and manufactured amenities. To the extent that the environment
has and will be degraded, it is in the pursuit of causes that are worthwhile, such as economic
growth and increased human happiness. In a well-known (among economists) bet between the
economist Julian Simon, and the ecologist Paul Ehrlich, Simon bet that the prices of a variety of
natural resources would decline over time as demand shifted to new technologies, while
Ehrlich predicted increasing resource scarcity and thus rising prices. Simon, it turns out, won
the bet on every count.
A contrary view sees markets and political forces as less benign. History is a series of
resource exploitations, and unless we take action now the future will promise more of the same,
although at a global scale. Ludwig et al. (1993, 17) point out four essential causes for repetitive
exploitation: wealth, or the prospect of wealth, generates political and social power that is used
to promote resource exploitation; environmental science is hampered by an inability to conduct
controlled experiments, so that consensus occurs only after substantial environmental change
has occurred; the complexity of environmental systems makes reductionist management
principles of limited use, and favors management by trial and error; and, natural variability
masks the initial effects of overexploitation. While past incidents of exploitation have ruined
local fish stocks, or rendered agricultural areas infertile, current and future practices could
influence human development worldwide.
For convenience, I call the two views the economic and the ecological. The typology needs to
be taken with a grain of salt, however. First, it does not convey the breadth of analysis and
opinion among practitioners in both fields. Certainly there are economists whose analysis
recommends large and immediate policy action, just as there are ecologists who are less
concerned about climate change. Second, it clumps analysts into just these two camps, and its
clumping can be tautological. There are analysts from a great many natural and social science
disciplines who are examining climate change. Whether we think of their analysis as primarily
economic or ecological in orientation depends on exactly that which we are seeking to explain:
the dominant assumptions that they are using. However, the typology is useful because it
allows us to classify, and thus remember, general categories of arguments. In general,
economists performing cost benefit analysis (CBA) have used a set of assumptions that drives
2their models in the direction I have noted. In general, ecologists have been more concerned with
system instability.
Both approaches are internally consistent, yet often times mutually incompatible. Policy
makers frequently justify their particular stances towards environmental regulation based on
one or the other of these viewpoints. In the issue area of climate change, the use of these
arguments is especially pronounced. During the Bush administration, for example, the United
States took a decidedly “economic” approach, and resisted the call for binding commitments to
reduce greenhouse gases. This echoed the recommendations of many economists, who take the
issue seriously yet urge governments not to overreact (Nordhaus 1994a; Manne and Richels
1991; Peck and Teisberg 1995). European nations, by contrast, have often relied on the more
ecological or engineering-based perspective. Perhaps because they have less of an attachment to
free markets, have a greater history of social control of individual action, or have a greater
historical familiarity with collective environmental management, European governments have
tended to favor policies placing tighter limits on greenhouse gas emissions. Certainly the
difference between European and United States responses can be attributed, in part, to causes
other than this academic divide. The United States, lacking a parliamentary system, find it
difficult to make sweeping policy changes. The European governments may have had other
reasons for advocating binding targets: the Thatcher government in Britain was eager to break
the coal union, and the Schmidt government in Germany wanted to maintain the high ground
against the Green Party on the issue of nuclear energy. Still, the general political discourse in
Europe has focused on the dangers of uncontrolled climate change, while in the United States
the government has downplayed the risks of climate change compared to the burden on the
economy of reducing carbon emissions.ˆ 1 For instance, in 1990 the Dutch government issued the
following statement:
[W]e think that a cost benefit analysis has limited applicability in guiding
policy formulations especially when dealing with global intergenerational
problems. This is not only due to our limited understanding of global
geospheric / biospheric processes, but also due to our limited capability to
predict the future. Besides, other considerations point to the need to take action
now (White House Conference 1990).
At the same time, the United States government issued a statement highlighting the
uncertainties inherent in the climate change problem, a desire to base policy on cost benefit
analysis, and a rationale for waiting before implementing any new policies:
The United States believes that the uncertainties associated with the timing and
magnitude of possible global change mean that policies will vary in their
appeal as uncertainties are reduced; an appropriate strategy to address possible
global change based on today’s knowledge and in light of today’s economic
environment may be wholly inappropriate within a decade (White House
Conference 1990)
The divergence between these two perspectives can be both important and divisive. It is
important because taking action to address climate change will require coordinated global
resolve. Unless policy makers from different political cultural traditions can agree on certain
fundamentals, it is unlikely that they will achieve progress. The difference is divisive because
behind the two perspectives lie different sets of values and assumptions. Both perspectives
make sense according to their own background beliefs; reconciling the two views requires not
further analysis within each framework, but discussion of the values and assumptions
themselves. At the recent Rio+5 meeting in New York, and again at negotiations in Bonn,
American and European representatives had sharp differences of opinion, and little progress
                                                
1 A notable exception is Vice-President Gore, who has been outspoken on the need for policies to address
climate change and other environmental problems. At the same time, however, Gore has been less than
influential in the deliberations of other American policy-makers.
3towards emissions targets was made. In Bonn, for example, European ministers and
environmental organizations accused the United States of blocking efforts to curb climate
change, and the negotiations ended without agreement. The Conference of the Parties to the
Framework Convention on Climate Change, planned for Kyoto in December of 1997, promises
more of the same.
There have been a number of other attempts either to document or to explain the difference
between the two perspectives. Economist William Nordhaus (1994b) identified the difference of
opinion through analysis of a survey of nineteen experts on climate change, from different
disciplines. On all counts, the natural scientists estimated the future impacts of climate change
to be far worse than did the economists. The natural scientists, generally, focused on potential
non-linear and catastrophic responses in geophysical and ecological systems to changes in
greenhouse gas concentrations. The economists, generally, focused on the ability of people to
adapt to changing conditions. While one group saw the potential for the spread of tropical
diseases, the other saw the potential for farming in Siberia. Nordhaus does not, however,
attempt to explain the reasons for the difference. By contrast, advocates of cultural theory,
which I will discuss in greater detail later in this paper, attempt to explain the difference in
terms of different conceptions of nature. They contend that social discourses can be classified
into four general categories, and that the classification then explains and predicts the models
and assumptions used within that discourse.ˆ  According to cultural theory, the discourse of
economists is consistent with an individualist worldview, while that of ecologists is consistent
with an egalitarian worldview (Roe 1996).
Some economists are frustrated by the fact that many people do not agree with
interpretations. As Lester Lave writes:
Few people have addressed issues of global climate change within a benefit-
cost framework, and few seem inclined to do so, even after the framework is
brought to their attention. Not only do [economists] not control the debate, but
the language and framework have been defined by people who see a balancing
approach as unnatural, even wrongheaded, in thinking about these issues. If
economists are going to engage a more general audience, [they] need to give
more attention to the “world views” of the public and those who dominate the
debate (Lave 1990, 98-9).
Lave offers three “world views” or mentalities: frontier, conservationist, and preservationist
(Lave 1990).2 Lave suggests that a CBA approach to climate change makes sense only to the
conservationists; the frontier mentality sees no reason to worry about climate change; the
preservationist mentality sees no justification for changing the climate to achieve greater
economic growth.
In this paper, I attempt to explain the differences using an interdisciplinary set of tools.
These include utility theory, prospect theory, mathematical explanations for discount rate
discrepancies, theories of the sociology of scientific information, as well as a simplified version
of Nordhaus’ DICE model of climate change. I believe that if the two perspectives are to be
reconciled, then it is important to take the different analytic approaches seriously even as one
attempts to explain their different results. Specifically, I seek to answer two questions. First,
what values and assumptions lie behind the two analytical approaches, resulting in different
intuitions about climate change? Second, how do those values and assumptions influence the
use and interpretation of cost-benefit analysis (CBA)?3ˆ
                                                
2 Lave’s world views are easily translated into cultural theory: with the frontier mentality is individualist;
the conservationist is hierarchical; and the preservationist is egalitarian.
3 These two questions raise a third issue, which I do not attempt to answer. That is, is my typology of
approaches correct or helpful? I believe it is, but leave this question to further analysis.
4Theory
Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis
Increasingly, decision-makers have come to rely on cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to examine
policy options (Munasinghe et al. 1996). CBA allows quantitative analysis of a wide range of
events. In CBA, the costs of the proposed policy are compared with the net benefits—only
projects for which the benefits exceed the costs should be chosen. Among competing policy
options each meeting this first criterion, the policy for which the difference between benefits
and costs is greatest should be chosen (Stokey and Zeckhauser 1978). Alternatively, the use of
CBA can be seen as a valuable exercise for thinking rigorously about the effects of one or more
policy options, even if the final decision is made on more qualitative grounds. The difference
between economists and ecologists are especially pronounced in their use and interpretation of
CBA, as I show later in this paper.
In order to apply CBA, it is necessary to have a model predicting the costs and benefits
associated with different policy options. There has been considerable recent work on modeling
the cost of abating GHG emissions (Maddison 1995, Ausubel 1995, Dowlatabadi 1995).
Generally, the analysis has fallen into two camps. Most economists have typically assumed a
level of current technology and exogenous rates of technological improvement. These models
have the advantage of being conservative about the potential for save-the-day technological
fixes to our energy and GHG emissions problems. They typically assume that there is some
minimal amount of inefficiency in the current system, yielding a potential for some abatement
in GHG emissions at little cost, but that after that limitations on GHG emissions will tend to rise
with increasing marginal costs (Hourcade et al. 1993). Another group of modelers, by contrast,
has typically modeled using assumptions about what is technologically possible, if not
currently available (Grubb 1995). These models have the advantage of treating technological
change in particular areas as being highly affected by demand.4 Nordhaus describes this as the
difference between economic-optimization models, and engineering-optimization models. The
former assume that markets and decisions are efficient, and there “are no costless GHG
reductions (except in situations with classical externalities)” (Nordhaus 1993b, 36).  The latter—
the engineering studies—point to energy conservation and other efforts that could both reduce
GHG emissions and lead to more efficient growth. Many economists would deride these studies
as the view that not only are there free lunches, “but that in a selected set of restaurants you can
get paid to eat” (Nordhaus 1993b, 36).
Several economists have applied CBA to more complicated questions, such as the value of
waiting and learning more about climate change, as opposed to acting now. Manne and Richels
(1991) use a two-period learning model, in which they assume that some learning would take
place in the next twenty years. Given that learning, they decide upon the best policy option to
be taken now. Peck and Teisberg (1993b, 1995) use a Carbon Emissions Trajectory Assessment
(CETA) model to determine the value of information at different points in time. They find that
the most gains to be made are in learning about the amount of warming to be caused by
increasing GHG concentrations, and the magnitude and shape of the damage function
associated with that warming. Kolstad (1993) adds on to an early DICE model, incorporating
stochasticity, to find the value of information to be high if decisions to limit emissions are
irreversible. Many of these models attempt to examine the role of “adaptive management”
(Walters 1987) in the climate change issue, either explicitly or implicitly.
There have three sets of criticisms of the use of CBA. The first set has focused on the
methodologies used and assumptions made to perform CBA specifically for climate change.
Schelling (1995) questions the traditional use of discounting to cover intergenerational time
spans. He suggests that society should make judgments about whom we want to help—
                                                
4 These models have also typically examined longer time horizons (Grubb 1995). This fact is consistent
with predictions of cultural theory ( see Thompson and Rayner 1998, Table 4.5).
5ourselves, our contemporaries in other parts of the world, or our descendants—and use CBA to
find the best way to do so, rather than model climate change with a discount rate applied to
future generations. Grubb (1995) questions assumptions of exogenous carbon intensity
improvements, and suggests that the principal costs associated with changing our energy
system arise from the rapid shift from one equilibrium to another. The service industry,
including the supply of energy, tends to show decreasing returns over short spans of time, but
increasing returns at larger scales of analysis, and could therefore be at a sub-optimal
equilibrium (Arthur 1988). It could be just as economically efficient for the United States to
function at the much lower carbon intensity level of Europe or Japan, but changing the energy
system to operate in this manner, and doing so quickly, could be costly. Repetto and Austin
(1997) critique the sensitivity of economic climate change models to the underlying
assumptions. They regress cost projections from an extensive number of economic models,
using eight explanatory dummy variables representing optimistic or pessimistic assumptions
about costs and benefits. They obtain an R2 of 0.8, meaning that the assumptions alone account
for most of the differences between model results.
A second set of criticisms looks at the application of CBA to decisions of large scale,
including climate change. Munasinghe et al. (1996) note that while CBA is most often used for
small projects, its use for climate change necessitates using general equilibrium analysis, which
is more difficult. CBA typically looks only at net gains or losses, and not how wealth is
redistributed. It assumes that the winners from a project can compensate the losers, such that
some people are better off and nobody is worse off. As the “leaky bucket” metaphor shows,
however, it may often not be possible for this to work in practice (Okun 1975). That is because
wealth transfers always involve some loss of efficiency, or deadweight loss, because of distorted
incentives and transfer costs. When governments undertake many small, independent projects,
each of which generates net economic benefits, it often the case that local gains from some
projects will cancel out the local losses from others, and everybody will be more or less better
off. In the case of climate change, the effects of which are highly correlated with each other,
Pareto improvement is a less likely outcome. Under a policy course that passes CBA, some
people may still be significantly worse off than they would have been otherwise.
A third set of criticisms concerns the use of CBA in general. Ideally, CBA measures
preferences in terms of changes in consumer surplus, represented by people’s “willingness to
pay” for competing public and private goods, or “willingness to accept” compensation for the
loss of a preexisting public good. One can criticize this approach to decision-making as anti-
egalitarian, since the “willingness to pay” of wealthy people will likely overshadow that of
poorer people. CBA will thus tend to favor the choices of the wealthy. The criticisms of CBA can
extend deeper however, questioning the validity of the rational actor paradigm on which CBA
depends. Indeed, CBA “shares the deeper shortcomings of the rational actor paradigm in that it
ignores equity and fairness and does not allow for the intricacies of trust, liability, and consent,
interwoven in a risk situation. In effect the rational actor paradigm acknowledges only one facet
of the multifaceted reality that risk situations present and is not capable of addressing the
cultural diversity that policymakers are finding they must acknowledge” (Jaeger 1998, 165).
Risk Aversion and Utility Functions
The use of CBA is potentially problematic when there is uncertainty over outcomes. That is
because what economists try to optimize is not money (consumption), but utility (happiness).
Economists have generally observed that the first unit of consumption matters more to people
than the second and subsequent units; that is, people experience diminishing marginal utility
returns from increases in consumption. Because of diminishing returns, most people
demonstrate an aversion to taking risks. CBA needs to take this into account, and doing so
requires making many assumptions about people’s preferences. One criticism of economics is
that often makes the same assumptions for all people.
This aversion to is consistent with having a concave utility function, as shown in Figures 1
and 2. On Figure 1, utility is plotted as a function of consumption. The fact that the curve
6becomes flatter reflects the fact that smaller amounts of marginal utility come from increasing
amounts of wealth. Figure 2 shows how this translates into a propensity for risk aversion.
Imagine that a person faces a lottery giving equal chances of consuming c or c’.  The expected
outcome is denoted by E(c), and would give utility u(E[c]). Because the utility curve is concave,
this utility is higher than the expected value of the two possible utility outcomes, E(u[c]).
Indeed, we can identify a certainty equivalent, c.e., that provides the same utility as the
expected utility of the lottery. This point, c.e., represents less consumption than the expected
amount of consumption of the lottery. The distance between c.e. and E(c) accounts for the
existence of insurance markets. Indeed, authors have suggested that climate change policies be
considered as a form of insurance (Manne and Richels 1991). In the case of climate change, for
which the aggregate societal impacts are likely to be less than 1% of total wealth, the movement
along either a social welfare or a utility curve is small, and the effects of the curve’s concavity
are minor. For economists, risk aversion plays a potentially minor role in climate change.
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Figure 1: Concave Utility Curve
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Figure 2: Diminishing Marginal Utility and Risk Aversion
When economists think about risk and uncertainty, they incorporate assumptions about the
curvature of people’s utility functions. When they apply this thinking to questions of social
welfare, they make further assumptions about a “social welfare” function. In both cases, they
use empirical findings to approximate what “typical” people value and prefer. Contrary to the
axioms of economics, a great deal of psychological research has demonstrated that most people
do not make decisions according to a single, well-defined utility function. Prospect theory,
originally proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), is one description of people’s observed
behavior. First, people tend to anchor their utility at their present level of consumption, and
perceive changes in consumption in relation thereto. Second, people tend to care more about
losing something they already have, than they do about acquiring something new. Third, while
people tend to be risk averse for gains in consumption, they are “risk loving” for losses. Fourth,
people place a great deal of emphasis on changes in assessed, or objectively measured,
7probabilities when the probabilities are close to 0% or 100%. Hence, people care much more
about the difference between a 0% and a 1% chance of some outcome occurring than they do on
the difference between a 35% and a 36% chance. Thus the small probability of a catastrophic
outcome would be very important to people. The first three features can be seen in Figure 3.
Utility is concave for points to the right of the origin, and convex and steeper for point to the left
of the origin. The fourth feature can be seen in Figure 4. Here, “subjective” and “objective”
probabilities do not necessarily correlate at a one-to-one ratio.
value
losses gains
Figure 3: Prospect Theory Utility Curve
0
1
1
Su
bje
cti
ve
 
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
Objective Probability
Ex
pe
cte
d R
es
po
ns
e
Ob
se
rve
d
Figure 4: Subjective and Objective Probability
These observations come from controlled experiments and real world examples. In controlled
experiments, doctors choose different treatments when the risks are expressed in terms of rates
of survival or rates of mortality. People purchase lottery tickets, giving them a miniscule chance
at a large sum of money, even when on average lotteries are a losing proposition. Daniel
Ellsberg has explained the escalation of the Vietnam War according to prospect theory, and
President Lyndon Johnson’s willingness to risk large US losses rather than accept a minor
defeat. Prospect theory does not say that people’s inconsistent behavior is good or bad, but
merely that it is a fact of life for most decision-makers. Prospect theory faces the same criticism
as utility theory, however, for using a single model of the “person” (Douglas 1998).
Prospect theory has a number of implications for the politics of climate change.
Subjectively, most people do not aggregate all costs and benefits into one lump, and then see
how wealthy they expect to be under competing policy options. Rather, to the extent that they
pay attention to economic models, they will consider how much they value the various
categories of changes that each policy implies. They will then compare the various gains and
losses in value to determine which policy they prefer. If we believe prospect theory, then it
8matters a great deal whether people perceive a particular policy as constituting a risk to future
increases in consumption, or risking something that they already have. In the former case, they
will tend to exhibit risk-averse behavior; in the latter, they will tend to demonstrate risk-loving
behavior. Furthermore, losses will matter much more to people than gains, and will tend to
drive the results of people’s intuition. How climate change is framed is thus important.
Environmental economics developed around the analysis of regulations intended to reduce
levels of pollution (Tietenberg 1988). In this case the status quo was clearly the pollution and the
absence of environmental regulation. Environmental economists have generally framed the
mitigation of climate change as a loss of economic surplus, and the results of those regulations
as benefits (Munasinghe et al. 1996, Nordhaus 1994a, Tietenberg 1988, Hope and Maul 1995).
They have tended to focus on uncertainty among the benefits of regulation, rather than the costs
(Munasinghe et al. 1996, Pearce 1996). Nordhaus, for instance, identifies the issues that
economic analysis of climate change seeks to address: whether to “intervene” to slow climate
change; how much to “intervene”; choosing the most efficient policy instrument; achieving
efficient and effective international cooperation; and, addressing uncertainty in the potential
effects of climate change (Nordhaus 1993b, 32-33). Andrew Dean states it succinctly: “If climate
change is going to damage the earth—and there is still much uncertainty about this—then one
needs to be able to quantify the damage. Such costs, in the established language of climate
change work, are the benefits of policies to slow the change, i.e. the damages avoided (Dean
1994, 26). This has potentially significant implications for intuitive responses to the problem.
For instance, imagine that CBA of a policy to prevent climate change revealed that the costs
and benefits of that policy were exactly equal. A decision-maker ought to be indifferent
between the particular policy and no policy at all—at least in economic terms—and should
decide on the grounds of other considerations, such as equity. In fact, most people are likely to
use their intuition to reject the particular policy in favor of no policy. On Figure 5, we can see
that the improved environmental quality from the policy is framed as a gain. On the same
figure, the costs to consumption of the policy are be framed as a loss, and will be kept in a
separate “mental account” from the gains. To most people, things that are framed as losses are
more important than things that are framed as gains. If we average the two changes in utility
the result is a utility change that is negative, when compared with the status quo, the point of
reference. Since the point of reference is no policy at all, most people will reject the policy to
reduce climate change. Thus the “assumption” of what constitutes a gain and what constitutes a
loss, really a judgment about what is the point of reference, will frame the issue in a way that
favors no change in policy.
Ecologists are likely to frame the gains and losses the reverse of how economists do. They
might perceive the environment, in its current state, as the point of reference. To the effect that
climate change alters the environment for the worse, they will perceive a loss of something that
they already have. For example, Mintzer (1987) models the degree of global “warming
commitment” that current development policies are creating. For every year that current
policies are in place, Mintzer projects an additional amount of future warming. Against this, he
discusses the economic benefits that current policies allow. His is a perspective opposite to that
of the economists; his point of reference is a world committed to preserving a sustainable
climate, and policies that allow additional release of greenhouse gases are a departure from the
norm, that ought to be justified before being pursued (Yohe and Cantor 1998).
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Ecologists may perceive the current standard of living as another point of reference.
Improvements in that standard of living through economic growth will be gains; to the extent
that efforts to curb climate change interfere with economic growth, the efforts may reduce those
gains. Goldemberg (1988), for example, develops a bottom-up model of energy demand. He
projects that industrialized countries can enjoy modest growth in per capita GDP while
significantly reducing the demand for primary energy. Lesser-developed countries can raise
their standards of living to levels approaching those of industrialized while increasing primary
energy demand only slightly. His model asks what additional economic benefits (i.e. growth)
can be gained while pursuing a more sustainable energy policy.
For ecologists, then, the point of reference is the policy that prevents climate change.
Compared to that point of reference, the current policy of allowing climate change has
associated with it various costs and benefits. On Figure 6, we can see that the added economic
growth from the current policy is obviously a gain. Likewise, the expected environmental
10
deterioration of the current policy is seen as a loss. As with the prior example, the losses are
more important than the gains. When losses and gains are framed in this way, most people will
prefer the point of reference, policies that preserve the environment, to the alternative, the
current policy of allowing climate change to continue.
Discount Rates
Economists and ecologists might also reach different conclusions about climate because of how
they discount the happiness of future generations. Most the effects of climate change will take
place at least 50 or 100 years in the future. In order to avoid these effects, society may have to
take action now. If one uses a high discount rate that is “too” high, then the costs of current
action will appear too large relative to the costs avoided many years in the future. If the
discount rate is “too” low, then the costs of current action will appear too small relative to the
costs avoided many years in the future. Deciding what discount rate to apply can determine
what policy appears to be optimal (Arrow et al. 1996,  Lind 1995, Manne 1995, Toth 1995).
In order to develop a theoretical model of why economists might use a discount rate that is
higher than that of ecologists, I start with the notion of a discount rate δ , which is the amount by
which we choose to discount future utility. I can express the utility of an individual, or of a
group of individuals as
( ) )(
1
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1
0 t
t
t
cuu ∑∞
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or in the continuous case, as
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I assume a utility function (for individuals) or welfare function (for groups), u(ct), as a function
of consumption in each time period, or in the continuous case at each moment of time. I impose
two standard restrictions, which are consistent with standard utility theory (although the
second-order condition is not consistent with prospect theory). They are:
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Economists have noted that the amount by which we discount future utility should not
necessarily equal the amount by which we discount future consumption (Koopmans 1960,
Arrow et al. 1996). We derive less marginal utility as consumption itself rises, because of the
falling rates of marginal utility expressed in equation (4). Arrow and Kurtz (1970) and others
have pointed out that our social rate of time preference, ρ t, depends on our utility discount
factor δ , the elasticity of our marginal utility, θ , and expected changes in future consumption.
Thus:
( )
t
dt
dc
tt
c
c
t
θδρ += . (5)
Formally, we can express θ (ct) as:
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From the inequalities in (3) and (4), we can determine the sign of θ (ct):
( ) ( ) 0)( >−−= ++tcθ . (8)
Thus:
0   >∀>
dt
dct
t δρ , and (9)
0   <∀<
dt
dct
t δρ . (10)
Our social rate of time preference will exceed our utility discount factor if we expect
consumption to rise, and will be less if we expect consumption to fall. The magnitude of the
difference is directly proportional to the rate at which consumption is changing.
There is, however, a considerable amount of controversy over what discount rate δ  to use
for utility. A number of economists have argued for an intergenerational utility discount factor
of zero (Cline 1992, 1993). They argue that we ought to count the happiness of future
generations as much as our own. More typical proposals for the utility discounting factor have
ranged from 1% to 3% (Nordhaus 1994a). These proposals also note that if we invest money in
productive capital, it can earn a return approaching 10%, far in excess of the rates proposed by
Cline. Finally, a number of economists and psychologists have noticed that people demonstrate
internally inconsistent rate of time preferences. Typically, people apply a higher rate of time
preference for consumption in the near future than they do for consumption occurring later on
(Arrow et al. 1996). For instance, a person might prefer $100 today to $101 tomorrow, but prefer
$101 several months from now to $100 one day earlier.
However, even if people are able to agree on what rate to apply to utility, they are likely to
disagree over how much they expect future consumption to rise and marginal utility to fall. To
the extent that disagreement correlates with whether one is an economist or an ecologist, the
two disciplines will tend to apply different social rates of time preference. It does correlate, for
three reasons. First, economists and ecologists who are alive today have different values.
Economists tend to see the world in terms of economic growth, and tend to project increasing
consumption of market goods. Ecologists, however, are likely to be acutely aware of resource
depletion and degradation (Yohe and Cantor 1998). Indeed, they may feel that “natural capital
is rapidly becoming more and more scarce and it is inappropriate to calculate the net benefits of
a project or policy alternative by comparing it with unsustainable options” (Yohe and Cantor
1998, 82). They may place great weight on the existence of public environmental quality, and
equate the loss of this quality with falling levels of consumption. Ecologists, because they likely
derive a large proportion of their utility from environmental quality, are likely to apply a lower
social rate of time preference to their decisions.
Second, economists and ecologists who are alive today are likely to imagine themselves as
having even more different values twenty years from now. Economists tend to model people as
having diminishing returns to total consumption. Ecologists, however, are likely to believe that
assumptions of declining marginal rates of utility may not be accurate for long-term decisions
about the environment (Yohe and Cantor 1998). If people do anchor their utility at their present
level, then it is reasonable to expect them to show decreasing marginal utility only relative to
their current consumption level. For instance, imagine that my present consumption is $1000,
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and that I take a daily walk in the park. The added utility I will get from the first additional
dollar (from $1,000 to $1,001) is greater than the added utility I get from the second additional
dollar (from $1,001 to $1,002). However, over time I readjust my expectations. Suppose, a year
from now, I consume $1,100. Again, the added utility from the first additional dollar ($1,100 to
$1,101) exceeds the next additional dollar. However, because I have readjusted my expectations,
we can not necessarily say that the utility change from $1,000 to $1,001 or $1,002 exceeds that
from $1,100 to $1,101 or $1,102. Indeed, it may be that once I have readjusted my expectations,
an additional dollar will have the exact same effect. Ecologists may be reluctant to assume that
people exhibit diminishing marginal returns as they grow wealthier.
Finally, economists and ecologists that are alive today are likely to project very different
values on future generations. Economists tend to model people as having relatively stable
preferences over time, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. However, even if people
experience decreasing marginal utility from wealth, they may derive increasing marginal utility
from environmental quality as their wealth increases. Thus the walk in the park, from the last
paragraph, is more important to the person who is wealthy than to the person who is worrying
about his or her next meal. This is consistent with the observation that the environment is a
luxury good—the more wealthy a society is, the greater the emphasis it places on
environmental quality (Tietenberg 1988). Ecologists may intuitively understand that future
generations, which are likely to enjoy higher material standards of living, will derive greater
enjoyment from environmental quality relative to other forms of consumption. Thus, ecologists
may believe that it is more important to leave future generations high levels of environmental
quality than it is to leave them other forms of capital stock. Indeed, ecologists argue that
“natural capital and human-made capital are largely complements (rather than substitutes), and
that natural capital is increasingly becoming the limiting factor for further development”  (Yohe
and Cantor 1998, 82). Because they do not convert the enjoyment of public and private goods
into a single metric, total consumption, ecologists are likely to apply a lower social rate of time
preference to the environment than they do to other forms of consumption.
Cultural Theory
Cultural theory has long attempted to explain the differences in assumptions that I examine in
this paper. First proposed by anthropologist Mary Douglas (1978), cultural theory maps
different people’s beliefs according to “grid” and “group”. Grid refers to the constraints people
perceive on their behavior. Group refers to people’s level of social connectedness. According to
cultural theory, where a person or a social discourse falls on the grid-group space correlates
highly with the attitudes towards a number of social and environmental concerns. As a general
heuristic, cultural theory defines four types of social solidarity, shown in Figure 7.5
For example, cultural theory correlates each of the social solidarities with a different “myth”
of nature. Individualists, who see nature as “benign”, perceive it as always returning to a stable
equilibrium. Hierarchists see nature as stable within identifiable boundaries—the role of rules is
to make sure that nature stays within those bounds. Egalitarians see nature as inherently
unstable, and believe that we need to be careful to maintain the current precarious equilibrium.
These attitudes are shown in Figure 8.
It is easy to say that economic discourse follows individualist lines-and thus sees nature as
benign-while ecological discourses are more egalitarian. Saying this, however, falls victim to a
major criticism of cultural theory: that it is tautological (Boholm 1996). One’s expressed
attitudes towards social and environmental issues determine where on the grid-group map one
falls. This location, then, predicts one’s attitudes towards those same social and environmental
factors. According to this criticism, then, cultural theory has no predictive power. In order to
make my analysis robust to this criticism, I do not use cultural theory explicitly to explain the
different assumptions and conclusions of economists and ecologists. I do use cultural theory,
                                                
5 Depending on the author, article, and year, cultural theory sometimes uses threefold or fivefold
classification systems. In this paper, I use the fourfold system that has become the industry standard.
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however, as an organizing framework for expressing uncertainty. Using this framework, I
develop a set of assumptions that are different from those of economists, and yet can be used in
the economists’ own models. In the following section, I do this for a modified version of
Nordhaus’ DICE model.
grid +
grid –
group – group +
The Fatalist The Hierarchist
The EgalitarianThe Individualist
Figure 7: Grid/Group Analysis
grid +
grid –
group – group +
nature capricious nature perverse/tolerant
nature benign nature ephemeral
Figure 8: Cultural Theory Myths of Nature
Application
Using Economists’ Assumptions
To illustrate how economists and non-economists would arrive at different results with CBA, I
use a simple model of climate change.6 The model, and its baseline parameter values, is similar
to Nordhaus’ (1994a), although some of the equations in my model are slightly different, to
account for endogeneity of damage and control costs. The DICE model has been very influential
in the climate debate, perhaps the most so among economic models. It has been criticized for
underestimating the magnitude of the climate change problem (Kauffman 1997) and for
                                                
6 I present the derivation of the model and its parameter assumptions in the appendix.
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overestimating control costs (Grubb 1995). Nevertheless, it provides a good starting point for
analyzing the differences between economic and ecological assumptions.
For illustrative purposes, I assume a choice between five policy options. The first option,
“none”, is to continue economic development along its present course. Any policy measures
addressing climate change would take the form of ex post adaptation, rather than ex ante
mitigation. The emissions generated under this scenario are what I later refer to as baseline
emissions. The second policy response, what I label “no regrets”, would be to make a small
effort now to reduce greenhouse emissions.7 ˆ  This corresponds closely to the policy response
that Nordhaus (1994a) also finds to be optimal. It represents a 10% reduction in baseline carbon
emissions, phased in over ten years, beginning in the year 2,000. The third policy response I
label “now”. It represents a 50% reduction in baseline carbon emissions, implemented rapidly
in the year 2,000. The fourth policy response, which I label “gradual”, also represents a 50%
reduction in baseline emissions. These reductions take place uniformly over the course of 50
years, beginning in the year 2,000. The final policy option, which I label “later”, represents a
50% reduction in baseline emissions, taking place in the year 2,050.
I model the effects of these policy options across four potential states of the world,
representing uncertainty over the sensitivity of climate to greenhouse gas emissions. In the first
state of the world, the greenhouse effect does not exist—temperatures do not rise with changes
in greenhouse gas concentrations. In the second state of the world, approximately representing
the low end of Houghton et al. (1996) estimates, mean global surface temperatures eventually
will rise by 2.0° C in response to a doubling of greenhouse gas concentrations. In the third state
of the world, approximately representing the Houghton et al. (1996) median estimate, mean
global surface temperatures will rise by 3.0° C in response to the same doubling. In the fourth
state of the world, representing the high end of the Houghton et al. (1996) estimates,
temperatures will rise by 4.5° C.
The model projects world consumption through the next 400 years. It then calculates the
corresponding aggregate utility, which it discounts at 3% per year. It then takes the sum of
discounted utilities for the five policy response scenarios, across the four different potential
sensitivities of climate to greenhouse emissions. The model treats baseline utility as that
occurring with zero climate sensitivity and no policy response. All other utilities are presented
as a fraction of that baseline utility. Figure 9 shows the results.
The model projects that the best policy option is either none at all or the no regrets
response, depending on the sensitivity of climate to greenhouse gas concentrations. This result
is consistent with that of Nordhaus (1994a), and many other economic assessments, including
Bruce et al. (1996). If the climate is insensitive, no response is clearly best. For the other three
climate sensitivities, the no regrets response is the best. In all cases, the three major reductions
in greenhouse gas emissions are worse than no response at all. The worst policy is immediate,
large-scale cutbacks; indeed the magnitude of the economic setback this policy would produce
far exceeds the potential setback from climate change itself. If we are to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by 50%, the best thing to do is to wait as long as possible before doing so.
                                                
7 The term “no regrets” comes from the notion of being able to take a limited amount of action that is cost
effective even if climate change is not a problem. If we assume that there are some preexisting market
inefficiencies—from tax policy, externalities, or imperfect competition—then it is possible that certain
policies could lead to increased short term efficiency.
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Figure 9: Model Using Economic Assumptions
Using Other Assumptions
I test the model for its sensitivity to the standard economic assumptions by running it with
different parameter values, and with uncertainty expressed across different dimensions. While
economists have typically modeled uncertainty in terms of different climate sensitivities to
changing greenhouse gas concentrations, ecologists are more likely to consider different
ecosystem and societal impacts associated with a given amount of temperature rise. Thus, I
treat as given the Bruce et al. (1996) middle scenario of 3.0° C, but use a range of estimates about
the costs of both total and incremental temperature changes. This represents uncertainty about
the stability of the system as a whole—whether it is one that is fundamentally in equilibrium, or
whether it is one that could tip fairly easily. I also express uncertainty in the cost of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions.
I model four states of the world to represent the different world views of cultural theory
(Douglas 1978, Schwarz and Thompson 1990, Thompson and Rayner 1998). The first state of the
world, which I call individualist, is that of the economists. This represents a belief that
ecosystems are generally stable, but that the costs of emissions abatement rise quickly and non-
linearly with the amount of abatement. The parameters in the second scenario, the fatalist, are
similar to the first, except that emissions abatement costs are linear. Hence, it does not matter as
much what policies we adopt. The third scenario, the hierarchical, differs in two respects. First,
the cost of greenhouse gas abatement is a function not of total abatement, but only of
incremental abatement. This represents the view that social systems face some management
costs in switching to new methods of production, but if done correctly the long run will be just
as efficient as with the old methods. Second, the costs associated with incremental temperature
change have been increased by one order of magnitude. This represents the view that nature
may be somewhat unstable in the face of large perturbations, and that for rapid changes in
temperature there may be drastic implications for society. The egalitarian scenario assumes that
there are no net costs associated with reducing greenhouse gas emissions—technology
improvements in the direction of clean energy such as solar and wind are completely desirable
for other reasons. Furthermore, the cost of incremental temperature change has been increased
by another order of magnitude. This represents the idea that nature is very unstable, and could
generate catastrophic outcomes in response to modest changes in mean surface temperatures
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Finally, I capture some of the discussion over discount rates by using a variable discount
factor. Instead of discounting all time periods at 3.0%, I discount the first 50 years at 3.0%, the
next 50 years at 2.0%, the next 100 years at 1.0%, and all subsequent years at 0.5%. This better
approximates people’s own intuitive discounting of future utility (Arrow et al. 1996). Although
it would be best to discount consumption at one level, and environmental quality at another,
the model is to simplistic to disaggregate goods in this manner.ˆ 8 Figure 10 shows the results of
the model. I present the same five policy options as in the prior section. Again, all utilities are
expressed as fractions of baseline utility, which in this case is no policy response under the
individualist scenario.
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1.000
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Utility
none
no regrets
now
gradual
later
Policy Response
Figure 10: Model Using Ecological Assumptions
The individualist scenario looks very much like the results of the prior model. The no regrets
policy response is the best, and the large-scale immediate cutbacks are the worst. In the
remaining three scenarios, however, the ordering of the policy options is reversed. The best
policy option is the immediate reduction of emissions by 50%. This is followed by gradual
large-scale reduction, delayed large-scale reduction, and then the no regrets policy response.
The worst thing is to do nothing at all. In the egalitarian scenario, the implications are the most
pronounced.
Interpreting the Model
The results generated by the model can and will be interpreted differently by different people,
each of whom is acting responsibly and intelligently. A reasonable response for economists is to
trust the results of the first chart, Figure 9. These results were produced using the best available
estimates of costs and benefits of climate change policies. Obviously the model could be
improved upon, and we should expect that to happen over time. As scientists learn more about
climate change, we will see greater certainty about the magnitude of temperature changes. That
                                                
8 Likewise I do not differentiate between the scenarios when it comes to discount rates. The scenarios
represent the potentially different outcomes of climate change, depending on how nature and human
systems actually respond. Discount rates are subjective, and therefore do not possess the same type of
uncertainty. Note that cultural theory does predict different treatment of time and discounting by each of
the four world views (see Thompson and Rayner 1998).
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is, we will see the variance of future estimates to shrink, and the median estimate to either rise
or fall, but the expected value of the median estimate to remain constant. Since the best
response to any of our likely scenarios—either 2.0°, 3.0°, or 4.5° C—is the no regrets policy
response, that is the one that we should adopt. Because the future may surprise us, and our
median estimate may change substantially, we should be prepared to alter our future emissions
strategy. Furthermore, if we learn more about the costs and benefits of policy options, we
should be prepared to alter the parameters of our model, and potentially change our emissions
strategy. Again, future estimates of costs and benefits will likely change, but if our present
analysis is correct the expected—or average—change should be zero.
Ecologists, however, might come to different conclusions. These conclusions will depend on
two patterns of thought. First, the conclusions will depend people’s perception of risk.
Ecologists are likely to take a risk averse stance toward climate change. This will be most
pronounced if they perceive the effects of climate change to be losses in their standard of living,
and the benefits of uninterrupted economic growth to be gains. As modeled by economists, risk
aversion should take into account the probabilities associated with the likely outcomes of
climate change, and weight each potential outcome accordingly. In practice, most people tend
to over-weight the likelihood of low probability outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In
some cases, very unlikely consequences of climate change will shape people’s subjective
impression of the issue (Patt 1997). For this reason, the egalitarian scenario on Figure 10 is likely
to play an important role in shaping people’s responses. Even if the individualist scenario, the
one derived from the best estimates of the economic effects of climate change, is the most likely,
the possibility of more catastrophic outcomes may determine the choice. Even if the egalitarian
scenario is highly unlikely, its mere possibility will shift the certainty equivalent for the five
policy options. More importantly, ecologists are unlikely to take the model’s representation of
aggregate utility at face value. They are likely to ask “What will climate change do?” and “What
will it take to stop it?” They will then place answers to these two questions in separate mental
boxes, comparing them in accordance with the general descriptions of prospect theory.
The second, and more complex, account of why ecologists may prefer the substantial policy
options derives from their impressions of scientific and mathematically derived information.
Ravetz (1990) discusses the notion of the quality of scientific information. He develops a
framework for categorizing information according to its numerical quantity, and three different
descriptions of its reliability: spread, assessment, and pedigree (Ravetz 1990). The first concept,
spread, is similar to the confidence bounds often presented with statistical information. The
second concept, assessment, represents the level of aggregation at which the original data were
measured. The final concept, pedigree, represents the level of acceptance within varying subsets
of the scientific community that the data command. In the case of climate change, it is important
to recognize the limitations of the inputs to the model. In understanding the uncertainty
associated with the model, we should understand the processes at which the various
parameters were estimated. The range of temperature responses to a doubling of greenhouse
gas concentrations, for instance, came about through the use of general circulation models of air
and ocean currents. These are limited in their degree of complexity by the speed of the
computers on which they are run. Furthermore, the numerical range has not changed, even as
the models themselves have produced different outputs over time; this may reflect the politics
of publishing official estimates of climate change impacts (Van der Sluijs et al. 1997). Other
parameter estimates were arrived at through equally problematic methods, or with equal
imprecision. Estimates of mitigation costs, for example, are generally made at the level of one or
two significant digits. For example, an estimate of 2% of GDP means that the value could be
anywhere between 1.5% and 2.5%. This represents an uncertainty of nearly 50% of the value of
the parameter itself. According to Ravetz (1990), the model’s final output is only as accurate as
the weighted uncertainties in the inputs allow.
In prior sections, I presented the results of the model so as to maximize, visually, the
variance between the different policy responses, scaling the charts to show only the top 1% of
baseline utility. It would be equally legitimate, however, to present the model output scaled
over the full range of possible values, from 0 to 1. Figure 11 is a re-scaled version of Figure 9,
and Figure 12 is a re-scaled version of Figure 10. Looked at in this manner, it may not matter
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very much, from a perspective considering net effects, what we do about climate change. The
differences between the outcomes of different policies are completely overshadowed by the
uncertainties in our original data.
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Figure 11: Rescaled Model Using Economic Assumptions
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Figure 12: Rescaled Model Using Ecological Assumptions
Conclusion
No issue is certain or easy. Climate change is more difficult, and less certain, than most. First,
climate change has the potential to cause catastrophic change, or very little change at all.
Second, implementing policies to reduce climate change will take an unprecedented level of
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global cooperation. Third, taking steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will necessitate
restructuring of energy systems across the world. The list goes on. Through the IPCC and other
assessment panels, a tremendous amount of information, much of it conflicting, has been
generated to address the issues that climate change raises. However, different people have
consistently interpreted that information in different ways. Some have called for rapid and
widespread policy actions. Others have urged caution. To many people, it has seemed like the
different groups have not been able understand each other at all, and emotions have run high.
If policy makers are to make sound decisions to address climate change, they not only need
good information, they also need to know how to use that information. The purpose of this
paper has been to show how different groups of people might use information differently. First,
they might perceive of costs and benefits differently, and assign risks to different aspects of
climate change policies. Second, they might interpret the passing of time differently, assigning
different weights to present and future generations. I have attempted to demonstrate, through
my interpretations of a computer model, how these people could arrive at different viewpoints
while using the same tools.
In terms of aggregate utility, a wide range of policy options generates essentially identical
results. We know, however, that these policy options are likely to have major impacts across
different sectors of society. For instance, the model that I have used predicts that reducing
greenhouse gas emissions by 50% in the year 2,000 will result in temperatures about 2° C lower
than if we do nothing. This could mean the difference between flooding coastal regions, or not.
As another example, we know that reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 50% is likely to
involve a radical restructuring of industrialized countries’ energy systems. There may be
economic winners in this process—the owners of technology to produce renewable or nuclear
energy, for instance—but there will also be losers, such as owners of oil and coal reserves.
Deciding whether to undertake major changes depends on how we view, and wish to affect,
these various groups of people and social systems.
Economic models of climate change at the regional level generally predict the damages to
tropical, coastal, and developing countries to be large (Mendelsohn et al. 1997). These countries
are often heavily reliant on agriculture, which will suffer most. They are also vulnerable to sea
level rise, and increased storm surges. While some models predict that developed countries will
also suffer losses from climate change, others predict modest gains due to warming of high
latitude regions (Mendelsohn et al 1997, Mendelsohn and Neumann 1998). If we believe the
analysis of Grubb (1995) or Arthur (1988), the main costs associated with avoiding climate
change will be in switching from one local equilibrium to another. Hence the industrialized
countries, which are already heavily invested in fossil fuel energy production, will bear the
brunt of the costs of changing course. We need to decide the relative merits we give to equity
and to efficiency. If we envision a future of greater equity than today, it may be more efficient to
achieve that through avoiding climate change, than by allowing climate change and then
making ex post wealth transfers.
Ecologists and others are likely to argue that other factors, which are not easily measured
by economists or captured in economic models, should determine our policy choices. Even if
climate change itself is likely to be minor, a lot of people spend a lot of time worrying about it.
Perhaps alleviating this worry should be the basis for action. Rayner (1995) argues that even if
the climate change problem did not exist, we would have to invent it. That is because the world
now faces the need for some policy problem to be the basis for global environmental
governance. The experience with institution-building and -maintenance that climate change
provides will be the principal legacy of the climate change problem. The effectiveness with
which society responds to climate change will directly or indirectly influence how well society
can respond to other issues of global significance. Wynne (1996) and others argue that risks
themselves are “socially constructed”. Thus, what the real implications of climate change are,
along with their associated probabilities, depend less on natural forces than on how people
perceive them.
Even if economists don’t have much to say about the problem of climate change as a whole,
ecologists still admit that they are still relevant when it comes to sorting out the details. For
instance, economic analysis can show what methods of controlling greenhouse gas emissions
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are likely to be the most effective, and come at the lowest cost. Economic analysis will also show
where the economic impacts from climate change, and efforts to control climate change, are
likely to be severe. Thus, “applying the foundations of economic efficiency to the construction
of global policy can produce dramatic results, even if the prescribed policy targets are drawn
from outside what might be supported by the economic paradigm” (Yohe and Cantor 1998, 90).
If society is to deal effectively with climate change, it will need economic analysis to do it well.
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Appendix—Mathematical Model of Climate Change
The model I use here predicts the economic impacts of different policy and state-of-the-world
scenarios involving global climate change. It is very simple in its form, aggregating the entire
world into one region, and dealing with the economy as a whole. While the model allows for
some representation of uncertainty, it does not allow for stochastic uncertainty within a
probability distribution. It is largely based on the Nordhaus (1994a) DICE model, which is the
latest in a series of models built by Nordhaus (1993a, 1992, 1991b). Indeed, unless otherwise
noted, all equations are taken from Nordhaus (1994a). The computer version of the model is
programmed in Microsoft Excel, on the Macintosh/Windows platform.
Climate Change Equations
The model begins with an equation accounting for the increase in carbon concentrations due to
anthropogenic sources of greenhouse gases (GHGs):
)590)(1(590 11 −−+=− −− tmtt MEM δβ . (11)
Equation (11) describes the interaction between human emissions of GHGs and their
concentration in the atmosphere. In equation (11), t describes time, which I measure in years. Mt
is the atmospheric accumulation of GHGs, in billions of tons (Gt) of carbon equivalent. Et is the
rate at which humans are emitting carbon or its equivalent. Of the carbon emissions that
humans pump into the air, a fraction β  remain in the atmosphere until the next period; those
that survive until the next period are then removed at a rate δ m, the value of which reflects a
half-life of approximately 100 years. Pre-industrial levels have been estimated at 590 Gt. The
value for Mt in 1995 has been estimated at 764 Gt.  E(0) would be the rate of carbon emissions
today, which I take to be 8.0 Gt. per annum (IPCC 1996).
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Equation (12) describes GHG emissions as a function of economic output, carbon intensity of
the economy, and the policy in place at time t. Yt describes gross world output, measured in
trillions of 1989 US$. The control variable µ t represents the policies in place to limit carbon
emissions, expressed as a fraction of their baseline amount. The state variable σ t measures the
carbon intensity of economic output, measured in Gt per $1989 trillion. Note that σ t is an
exogenous variable which follows an asymptotically decreasing path. This can be expressed as:
( )( ))exp(1exp0 tat δσσ σσδγ −−= , (13)
where γ σ  and δ σ  are parameters reflecting initial growth rates and slowdown in growth rates.
This leads σ  to decrease in the limit towards ( )
a
a
δ
γσ exp0  as ∞→t . Likewise Yt also varies across
time, although its growth represents a combination of endogenous and exogenous factors.
( ) θθ tttt KNAY −∗= 1 . (14)
In equation (14), Nt represents the population, Kt is total accumulated capital, and 
∗
tA  is the net
productivity of labor. Equation (4) is a general Cobb-Douglas production function of constant
returns to scale, where θ  and 1-θ  are the relative productivity of labor and capital. Capital can
be assumed to grow during each period as a function of output, Yt, accumulated capital, Kt,
consumption, Ct, and depreciation, δ k:
( ) ttktt CYKK −+−=+ δ11 . (15)
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In equation (15), δ k is an invariant parameter, while Ct is one of two control variables. Thus one
source of the endogeneity in Yt is the control variable Ct. Another, however, is the variable of
labor productivity, which depends, among other things, on the level of climate change and
control of climate change.
[ ]( ) [ ]( ) tttbttttDt AbbTTDTA θθ µµµ −−− −−∗ −−−−++= 1131 11 1211229 11 . (16)
At is the exogenous change in labor productivity, and [ ]( ) θµµµ −−−−− 113 1211 ttbt bb  is an
endogenous change due to control costs. Here, b1 and b2 are parameters describing the weight
and total cost of implementing total levels of control, and incremental amount of control. The
total level of control is raised to the power b3. In accordance with Nordhaus’ estimate we set at
2.887. The inclusion of incremental amounts of control represents the fact that costs are driven
by the total amount of control in place as well as by the rate at which control is instituted. The
latter is an approach used by Grubb (1995), and differs from that of Nordhaus (1994a).
The expression [ ]( ) θ−
−
−++ 11 12
2
91 ttt
D TTDT  accounts for losses due to temperature rise, and
is a function of the square of total temperature increase and the temperature increase during the
most recent period. D1 and D2 are parameters weighting the relative importance and absolute
magnitude of both damage elements. This differs from the Nordhaus model in the addition of
D2 and the one-period temperature increase, and reflects more recent thinking about the true
impact of temperature change on economic productivity. The At and Nt appearing in equations
(14) and (16) both follow a growth pattern similar to that for σ t, thus:
( )( )tt nnn eNN δδγ −−= 1exp0 , and (17)
( )( )tt aaa eAA δδγ −−= 1exp0 . (18)
These imply that as ∞→t , Nt approaches ( )nnN δγexp0  and At approaches ( )aaA δγexp0 , reflecting
growth that moves asymptotically towards an equilibrium level. Equation (6) also depends on
the total and marginal rise in temperature at time t.
( )( )[ ]∗
−−−−
−−−+= 111
1
11 12
2)/1( tt
R
tttt TTTFRTT τλ , and (19)
( )( )( )∗
−−
∗
−
∗
−+= 1111 12
2
2 tt
R
Rtt TTTT τ . (20)
Tt in equations (19) and (20) is the rise in mean global surface temperature, while 
∗
tT  is the rise
in deep ocean temperature. λ  is the equilibrium change in temperature for a given change in
atmospheric concentration. R1, R2 and τ 12 describe the thermal capacities of the surface
atmosphere, the deep ocean, and the rate of energy transfer between them. Ft measures
radiative forcing.
ttt OMF +×= )2log(/)590/log(1.4 . (21)

 <−+
=
otherwise                                   42.1
150if  000034.0125.2604. 2 ttt
Ot . (22)
Ot represents the combined radiative forcing due to exogenous factors. I express the control
problem as being that of maximizing aggregate consumer utility over the infinite future.
( )∑∞
=
−
−
−
+
0
1
, 1
)1(max
t
N
C
t
t
C
t
t
tt
N
τ
ρ
τ
µ
. (23)
In problem (23), ρ  represents the rate of time preference, and τ  is a measure of relative risk
aversion with respect to period consumption. Consumption, Ct, is one control variable, and is
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constrained by the limitations on output built into equations (11) through (22), and the fact that
consumption over time can not exceed total output. Although it does not appear in problem
(23), there is a second control variable implicit in the model: limitations on GHG emissions,
represented above by the variable µ t. Recall that µ t appeared in equations (12) and (16). We
assume that government policy can influence not only µ t but also, through a variety of policies
designed to influence saving patterns, Ct. The computer model does not maximize utility, but it
does show the utility associated with each policy.
Deriving Cost Parameters
Deriving the parameter values for my model is not easy, since the total effect must be spread
between both total and incremental change. In order to find values for the parameters D1 and
D2, I run a least squares regression on a number of estimates of losses resulting from climate
change, using the following model:
G D x D xi i i i= + +1 1 2 2
2 ε . (24)
In equation (24), Gi represents the estimate of total losses, measured in percent of Gross World
Product (GWP), that different economists have predicted for different amounts of climate
change. I make the assumption that the rise in temperature will follow a linear path, a
combination of an exponential rise in carbon concentrations due to increased output, and a
logarithmic rise in temperatures in response to carbon concentrations. For each estimate i, then,
I set x1i as the average annual temperature increase, and x2i as the total temperature increase. My
data come from Bruce et al. (1996. 203). The five estimates used are the most recent by Cline,
Fankhauser, Nordhaus, Titus, and Tol, (Bruce et al. 1996, 203). The values I receive are 0.002510
for D1 and 0.0008535 for D2. The standard error on the latter estimate is 0.00085. If my
hypothesis is that D2 is zero, then I have certainly not proved otherwise on the basis of our
comparison of five estimates of future damages. If, however, I believe that D2 is not zero, but is
some positive number, then the possible value could be quite a bit higher than the median
estimate. Finally, to check the legitimacy of my method, we run a second regression in which D2
was constrained to zero; I arrived at an estimate for D1 of 0.0052. Note that this parameter
estimate is only slightly larger than Nordhaus’ estimate of 0.0043. This may be accounted for by
the use of the more recent assessments in the IPCC 1995 report, which were not available to
Nordhaus. Peck and Teisberg (1993a) show that the predicted damage costs may be more
sensitive to non-linearity than to coefficient parameters. Thus it may be more fruitful to model
different estimates for the exponent on T2t, which I have assumed to be 2, than the values for D1
and D2.I have not taken this into account, and do not model different values for the exponent.
As with damage costs, my model differs from that used by Nordhaus in that I consider not
only the total amount of control but also the rate of control as being determinative. This reflects
a belief that a path of emissions control that is slow and steady will be less expensive than one
that is either sudden or erratic. This follows the approach used by Grubb (1995). In order to
derive values for b1 and b2, I run a least squares regression on past estimates of damage costs.
H b p b pi i i i= + +1 1 2 22 887. ε . (25)
Hi is the estimated total cost of control instituted. I take p2i as the total amount of control taken
and p1i as the average incremental control, assuming linear implementation of control measures
over time. My data come from Bruce et al. (1996, 304). I rely on seventy-two estimates of control
costs, each assuming a different levels of control (ranging from 5% to 96% reduction) by a
different date (ranging from 2,000 to 2,100). All of the estimates were made between 1990 and
1992. The values I arrive at are 0.05758 for b1 and 0.004509 for b2. Again, the estimate for b2 is not
significantly different from zero, having a standard error of 0.1739; using this form of
estimation, we would not be able to show that b2 is positive. However, my null hypothesis is
that b2 is greater than zero, and because of its large standard error could be quite a bit higher
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than my median estimate. As with damage costs, I compare my results with Nordhaus by
constraining b2 to be zero. Doing so, I estimate b1 at 0.05769. Nordhaus’ median estimate for b1,
assuming of course b2 to be zero, was 0.0690, which is reasonably close to my estimate.
Additional Parameter Values
The values for additional parameters are given in Table 1. They are taken from Nordhaus
(1994a) and Pizer (1996).
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Table 1
          Parameter symbol                 value
rate of time preference
relative risk aversion
output capital elasticity
initial productivity growth
rate of capital depreciation
decline in population growth
decline in productivity growth
retention coefficient for CO2
temperature sensitivity for CO2
initial intensity growth
decay rate of CO2
atmospheric thermal capacity
ocean thermal capacity
air–ocean thermal conductivity
1995 population (millions)
1995 population growth
1995 CO2 economic intensity
1995 capital stock ($trillion US)
1995 GHG concentration (GtC)
1995 excess air temperature (•C)
1995 excess ocean temp. (•C)
1995 productivity of labor
1995 global output ($trillion US)
total abatement coefficient
marginal abatement coefficient
total abatement exponent
total temperature coefficient
marginal temperature coefficient
ρ
τ
θ
γ a
δ k
δ n
δ a
β
λ
γ σ
δ m
1/R1
1/R2
τ 12
N0
γ n
σ 0
K0
M0
T0
T*0
A0
Y0
b1
b2
b3
D1
D2
0.030000
1.221300
0.376400
0.013000
0.045000
0.019500
0.011000
0.640000
0.714293
-0.011700
0.008330
0.048000
0.004545
0.440000
5590.000000
0.012400
0.385000
79.500000
763.600000
0.763000
0.117000
0.009630
24.000000
0.057580
0.004509
2.887000
0.002510
0.000854
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